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Introduction
Citizen participation in governancei s widely accepted as anexpression of citizen rights and a manifestation of citizen agency.Citizen engagement withinstitutions and policy processes gives shape and content to the meaning of citizenship by emphasising direct intervention of citizens in publicactivities; it places obligation on bothcitizens and state,helps toground the abstract relationship of citizenship w ithin t he consciousness of people,and reduces the often vast distancebetween the stateand its citizens (CommonwealthFoundation and CIVICUS 1999) . Citizen participation alsop roduces tangible benefits by meeting the concernnot only for citizen "voice",but alsofor citizen agency and influence (Cornwall and Gaventa 2001) . Whereit takes the shape of collectiveaction,it may alsobe seen as amechanism toclaim rights based on equaland full citizenship of the modern state, replacing traditionalclaims based on 'norms,c harity, benevolence,or patronage' (Kabeer 2002: 20) .
One area wherecitizen participation in the development policy process has featured very prominently is health. This article explores people' s perceptions about participation for claiming the right tohealthin ruralBangladesh,and the reality of experiences of participation in newly opened spaces for participation within the statehealthcare delivery system,knownas "community groups" (CGs). This article presents preliminary findings from researchinto the CGs that sought toexplore the enabling and disabling factors for citizen participationin theseintermediary spaces for citizen participationingovernance. 
Citizen participation in the health sector
The right tohealthis generally seen as the state' s obligation 'todeliver affordable,accessible health services toall' (Cornwall et al. 2002:1) . Increasing people' s voiceand influencein the health sector is believed tobeaneffective way of improving the performanceofhealth systems tomeet the right to health,by increasing access to services of the most vulnerable and disadvantaged groups,improving healthoutcomes generally and reducing health inequities.Activecommunity participation through ownership and implementation of localhealth services is now a widely accepted means of ensuring suchinfluence (MoHFW 1997; Das Gupta et al. 2000) .
In the context of the broader shift towards amore "people-centred" development model, the AlmaAta declaration of 1978identified as acriticalelement the involvement of people not just in the support and functioning of localhealth systems,but more importantly in the definition of healthpriorities and allocation of scarce resources.However,it was only in the late1980s that community participation emerged as ane xplicit strategy in health development; the means for achieving community participationare still debated. Alackofconceptual clarity persists about who exactly "the community" and t heir representatives are,a bout what "community participation" actually involves and about whether community engagement amounts toa real transfer of authority and responsibility or merely sponsored collaboration.
For the most part,community participation continues tobedefined as anadditionalingredient in healthcaredelivery and is valued primarily for its instrumental role in making health services more cost-effectiveby intensifying the impact of health sector investment,by increasing the chanceof success of health sector reforms,by changing the health-seeking behaviour of poor people,b y building partnerships between government and localcommunities,and soon (Kahssay and Oakley 1999) . References to the broader objectiveo f participationas establishing the citizen right tohave a voiceand toinfluencehealth systems areonly made in passing,if at all.
Experiments withcommunity involvement in healthindeveloping countries havenot yielded very conclusive results (Oakley 1999). While it has been relatively easy tomake initialcontact with community representatives,increasecoverage and sometimes garner activel ocali nvolvement in specifichealthactivities,for example vaccination campaigns,a ctualm echanisms of community participationhavebeen problematic.Severalfactors havebeen identified as contributing to this situation (Kahssay and Oakley 1999; Oakley 1999; Loewenson 1999) . One is the natureo f decentralisation and the difficulty of tackling local power hierarchies, whichmay bemorepowerful at the locallevel thanbureaucrats and professionals from the centre. Another is the fact that formal attempts at promoting community participation seldom include the documentation of procedures for participation,especially legaland institutional, in planning,management and arbitration (Loewenson 1999) . Further, the gap that often exists between community expectations and provider perceptions of what is needed and henceprovided gives poor people little incentive toinvest time and effort.Factors suchas unofficial user fees,negative and disrespectfulattitudes of health workers and lackofinformation for users increase the distance between communities and the health system and createbarriers toparticipation.
Empowerment and citizen participation
Amajor lesson that emerges from experiments around the world is that community participation cannot be seen simply as acomponent of health sector reform,but must be seen morebroadly as a completeapproach tohealthdevelopment.Akey determinant of the potentialo fcommunity involvement for fostering participation is the understanding and practiceofcitizenship. Higgins (1999) writes of the importancefor participation of having a senseoffull citizenship,being defined as having equal status by being accorded rights. Some authors haveargued that community participation requires transforming the passive client intoactivecitizen,first by empowering people withcitizenship as aformally ascribed political status,a nd next by mobilising people toact collectively, realizing citizenship as acollectively asserted socialpractice (Shaw and Martin 2000) . In the absenceo fa widespread senseo ff ull citizenship, thereis a tendency for activists to dominate the world of participatory politics and for ordinary citizens tobeexcluded. Participants areoften not representativeof the ordinary people that health systems wish to serve, while those who do not participatefeel they havelittle control and feel unimportant,marginalised or excluded as citizens (Mahmud 2002) .
The literature suggests severalpre-requisites for effectivecommunity participationindevelopment activity including in the health sector.First, participation requires some degree of individual empowerment reflected in a senseofcontrol over one' s life and individualagency, the feeling that one cancontributeby participating. Second,participation also requires a senseofcommunity empowerment or the belief that the collective voice will bemorelikely tobeh eardand haveg reater influence than individual v oices.Thus,participation and empowerment areinterdependent.As Sen puts it:
What people canpositively achieveis influenced by economicopportunities,politicalliberties, socialpowers,and the enabling conditions of good health,b asiceducation,a nd t he encouragement and cultivation of initiatives … the institutionalarrangements for these opportunities arealsoinfluenced by the exercise of people's freedoms, through the liberty to participatein socialchoiceand in the making of publicdecisions that impel the progress of theseopportunities. (1999:5) People arenot willing toparticipateif they do not feel that they areable tomake adifference,if the mechanismand procedures for participation are unfamiliar or too costly,or if they feel they arenot in control. Hence,it is important that the conditions becreated that enable citizens toparticipateor to act as citizens if they so wish, thereby developing their capacities as citizens in a virtuous cycle of citizenship participation (Lister 1997) .
In societies suchas Bangladesh, the acceptance of inequality and toleranceofinvisibility of the poor and the marginalised represent major barriers to the establishment of this virtuous cycle. It is argued that participationcan reverse this by creating a willingness among thesegroups tocontest their devalued status, marking the beginning of a transformation in their citizen status (Kabeer 2002 ). This involves ajourney from being anoccasionalcitizen withonly formal voting rights toclaiming, realising and eventually enjoying other socialand economic rights needed toachieve"full" citizen status.The steps in this journey are:
1. Acquiring socialand human resources necessary for participation and engagement,like selfesteem, s elf-confidence, v isibility and recognition. 2.Acquiring physicaland institutional resources like spacefor participation and deliberation and requisitei nformation,a ppropriate rules for deliberation and conflict resolution on amore equalbasis,capabilities and skills for deliberation and participation. 3.Establishing mechanisms for building trust, assessing change and learning deliberation and engagement tobeeffectivein reducing inequality and increasing access.
This article examines the extent to which community participation institutions in the health sector in ruralBangladeshfunction as spaces within which this journey cancommenceand progress, enabling citizen "voice" tobeheard,citizen influence tobef elt and provider accountability tobe established. The purposeof this article is not to trace the entirejourney (whichis covered more fully in Mahmud 2003) ,but tofocus on exploring prevailing notions about citizen participation as perceived by ordinary people and todetermine people' s perceptions about the boundaries of their participation space whichcreatebarriers tocitizen agency.
The Bangladeshcontext
The spaces for participation, whichare the focus of this study,formpart of the Bangladeshexperience withcommunity involvement in health systems initiated under the health sector reformprogramme as part of the Healthand Population Strategy Programme (HPSP)l aunched in 1998. This experienceis located in acontext whichhas a number of distinguishing features.
First, the prevalent perception is that of the state as guarantor of citizen status and custodianofall rights,legal,political,economica nd social. However, the actualexperienceof rights is implicitly shaped by the cultureof the paternalistic stateand dependent citizen,causing agapbetween formal recognised rights and realexperienced rights.This gapis differentiated by the extent of dependency and powerlessness (or lacko fe conomica nd institutional resources)and by the degree of nonrecognition and invisibility (or lackof socialand human resources)(see Kabeer 2002) .
Ina society like Bangladesh,a senseofcontrol and feeling of being usefuland able tocontribute, essentialfor citizen agency,is strongly linked to access tomaterial resources like land and education and tonon-material resources like position and authority within the community.The poor and marginalised are understandably very riskaverse and unlikely tobehavei n ways that violate traditionaln orms and common practices of allegianceand submission. The greater the degree of dependency and invisibility, the wider the gap is between the formaland the real. This creates "lesser"citizens and "unequal" rights.This,in turn, leads toperceptions of differentiated citizen roles with respect to responsibility for engagement and deliberation for informing and influencing policy.
Linked to this reality and perception is the construction of acitizen identity shaped by tolerance and silent acceptanceofinequality in status and rights.Thus, the belief is common that not everyone has equal rights or are"full" citizens.Inequality of rights and even denialof rights is rationalised and accepted as the naturalorder of things in aclass and power differentiated society.As Kabeer (2002: 21) points out, this 'absenceo fq uestion' by the marginalised and powerless is the result of mutually reinforcing experiences of denialof recognition and persistent devaluation by others (bureaucrats, service providers,professionals,elected representatives, well-to-do people,etc.) and their ownlow selfesteem and low self-confidence.
Institutions and s ystems responsible for providing and ensuring socialand economic rights in Bangladesh, starting from the parliament down tolocalelected bodies,markets,courts and public servicedelivery systems,operateat very low levels of effectiveness and accountability.This contributes to socio-economicpolarisation and extreme inequality of access.Formallocalelected bodies like the Union Parishad(UP) that devolvecontrol over state resources arepremised upon universal notions of democracy,but in reality operate within the context of localpower structures,prevailing politicalcultureand firmly entrenched social practices (Bode 2002) . Inaddition,institutions and systems that implement policy view the people they are supposed to servemoreas passive recipients and unquestioning beneficiaries,and at best clients and users,insteadofas citizens with rights toclaim and dissent.Thus, the dominant policy view regarding citizen participation and civicengagement for voicing needs and influencing policy is that participationis unnecessary and even viewed with suspicion and hostility.Indeed,policy may even be described as "managerialp aternalism" and as "disciplining" tocreate"good" citizens who are compliant users of publicprovision (Cornwall et al. 2002) .
Finally, the overriding featureof the Bangladeshi context is one of poverty, setting acontext against whichall systems with the responsibility of rights provisioning, suchas health,education, social safety nets,and financial services,and institutions like markets,courts and mediahave tooperateand need tobe set.Poverty mediates all action and non-action, participationand non-participation,being and wellbeing,determining the rationalisation and action not only of the powerless poor but alsoo f the powerfulnon-poor.
Participation in ruralBangladesh
Significant efforts havebeen aimed at initiating and introducing participatory processes into the development policy arena.Mostly,in response to externaldonor conditionality, therehas been a plethoraof forms of publicparticipation in policy and strategy formulation, ranging from stakeholder analysis and consultations topublicdialogues and community workshops for exchange of ideas and opinions between local residents and service providers,particularly during the preparation of the Poverty Reduction Strategy.Participatory consultations alsofeatured prominently in the preparation of the HPSP (Mahmudand Mahmud 2000) .
The health sector in Bangladeshis acombination of privateand publicdelivery systems,and is largely of poor quality,inequitable access,a nd nonaccountable provision (with the exception of a number of targeted verticalp rogrammes like immunisation). In1998,partly toaddress these weaknesses, the government decided,as part of the HPSP, to set upcommunity clinics in every village/ward with the aim of providing accessible essentialh ealth services to the most deprived population groups (women,children and the very poor). Community ownership would beensured by building the clinicon land donated by the village and by having the community sharecosts of construction and operation of the clinic with government.Ineachlocality acommunity group (CG),composed of localgovernment representatives, local serviceproviders and local residents committed to social workand representing various professions and socialclasses including the landless and women, would be responsible for the operation of the clinic and delivery of health service to the residents of the community.The CG was, thus,anew spacefor community participation and deliberation in the provision of accessible and affordable health services. It was believed that the community' s need tohave a reliable and responsivehealth service that was accessible by the most vulnerable groups and was answerable to them would be sufficient incentive for the community toparticipatein the operation of the stated elivery system at the locall evel, something that was quite uniquegiven the existing socialand policy environment.
Ani nitial study of the CGs by the author (Mahmud 2002) concluded that their operation and functionalperformancehadbeen constrained by severalfactors.Theseincluded: the selection of members was usually biased towards the well-off and professionalclasses; the lacko fo fficial recognition from the Ministry of Health, which contributed to the absenceofauthority,and the credibility of the CGs and the frequent absenceof effectivel eadership and proper delineation of authority and responsibility within the CG.Surveys of residents showed that levels of use were relatively high at 60 per cent, with women accounting for 84 per cent of the total:indeed men in one village stated that the clinic was for women only,given the overwhelming emphasis on oralcontraception among the services it offered. Most respondents were unawareof the existenceofachannel for registering their complaints about the clinics.Only 35per cent of respondents actually knew about the CG, and only 18 per cent of those who knew about it (6 per cent of all respondents) reported that CG members actually spoke to them and enquired about their healthproblems and needs.
The survey of CG members confirmed the initial finding (Mahmud 2002 ) that they weregenerally drawnfrom the village élite, with significantly higher levels of bothe ducation and income than the majority of the clinic users and frequently with strong connections tolocalpower structures.Nearly half of CG members owned or cultivated three acres or moreofland, whichputs them in the large landowning category,and all of them had tin or brick homes.All but one of the CGs included elected members of the UP, the lowest level of local government,a nd the UP chairman was most frequently cited as the sourceo f the original invitation tojoin the CG.Inmost cases therehad been very little interaction or communication with the larger community about the selection of CG members.
There was alsoa widespreadlackofclarity about the function of CG members,bothamong clinic users and among CG members themselves.Some of thoseinterviewed wereactually unawareof their CG membership (which was often conferred as an honorary status in recognition of land donations). Others were unable toname any specificfunctions of CG membership. Meetings of the CG were infrequently held and poorly attended,even by the chairpersons, the most frequently cited reason given being 'lackof time'. Inone CG the chairperson was not awareof whichdays of the week the clinic was open and whichdays the healthproviders were making home visits for immunisation.
Indiscussions withCG members,participation was not identified as anexpression of citizen rights or responsibility.The primary responsibility for creating a"good society",one that would provide education,healthcare,jobs, security and make and implement laws toget rid of all bad sides of society, was invariably vested in the sarkar (government). The perception of the omnipresent stateand its supreme legitimacy was evident in the ease with whichland donors wereidentified and construction workcompleted,a nd the almost casualand unilateral way in which suchanew and untested delivery mechanism was put in placepurely on the basis that it was the action of government.Everyone who was invited tobeamember of the CG readily agreed w ithout having ac lear notion of responsibilities.Nodoubts wereexpressed about the chances of success of the system and if there wereany differences of opinion or hesitations these werenot articulated.
The enormous credibility enjoyed by government and the strong belief in its benevolence precludes any role for citizen participation in the provision of rights or in oversight of state provisioning. This alsoinhibits willingness of people tochallenge publicaction of any kind. People' s limited knowledge about statedelivery mechanisms limits their capability toassess how the system operates and undermines their self-confidencein questioning government action.
Citizens are seen as having very limited responsibility,mainly focused on changing the behaviour of their fellow citizens rather thanon oversight of the actions of the state. CG members mentioned their responsibility tocreateawareness about good healthand hygiene practices and the importanceo f sending children to school, to motivateothers to refrain from "baddeeds"and to removepeople' s "superstitions". Inaddition, wealthy citizens are seen as having the responsibility for helping the poor in times of need,aperception supported by the Muslim normofgiving zakat (distributing acertain fixed percentage of one's income among the moreneedy).
This combination of limited legitimacy,élite politicalaffiliation, unclear responsibilities and deeply-rooted reluctance tochallenge the statehas contributed tolimiting the effectiveness of the CGs in mobilising collectiveaction. For example, when the supply of medicines from the thana (subdivision) healthcomplex tocommunity clinics was stopped for political reasons in late 2000,CGs did not openly challenge the decision. While CGs in many villages agreed that they should raise their ownfunds from the community in order tom eet costs of maintenanceand toensureat the least alimited supply of medicines, they have sofar been unable tomobilisecommunity support for or participation in this endeavour.
The following section deepens the analysis of the reasons behind this limited effectiveness by exploring people's own understandings of the boundaries of their participation spaceand the structuralconstraints in developing the capabilities needed for citizen participation. The last section discusses thesefindings and suggests some tentative conclusions about two sources outside the CGs of potential support for addressing the perceived resourceneeds of people for developing capabilities for participation.
Boundaries of participation space
Severalconstraints wereidentified by CG members and by local residents (clinic users and non-users), whichd elineated t he boundaries of t heir participation spaces.Many of thesee cho the challenges toinclusivecitizenship discussed by Kabeer (2002) .
Poverty
Poverty poses a very realchallenge tocitizen agency and restricts the boundaries of participation in rural Bangladesh. Poor people have to worklong and hard tom ake aliving. Anything not directly impinging upon their livelihoods or not of immediate urgency is low on their priority of time allocation. Participation is not costless; indeed, the costs of participation canbequiteprohibitive, especially for poor people and women. Wefound that women members of the CGs were very irregular in attending meetings,and the most common reason given was the burden of houseworkand the need to take careof sickfamily members.For most people thereis little incentive toparticipateinactivities that do not haveimmediateand relevant outcomes or whichhavelittle chanceofbeing effective. One male CG membercommented on the ability of the poor:'Ordinary village people do not have the ability todoanything because they arepoor.They live from hand tomouth, what are they able todo?' About his ownability apoor farmer said,'Iampoor. Icanhardly bear the burden of family expenses, thinking about healthcareis along way off'.
Power inequalities
Forms of inequality that reflect social relations in the "private" sphere(family,kin,community)are reproduced in the "public" sphereand constrain what people arecapable of doing toinfluencepublic action. These unequal social relationships between richand poor, young and old, women and men, not only inhibit citizen agency in general,but are even s uperimposed u pon t he interpersonal relationships within the CG.As a result, women and the poor areless likely toparticipateonan equalfooting or to the same extent as men or the non-poor.Women CG members werealsogenerally silent members,and attributed their silence tolack of education and knowledge. One educated woman CG member, who was the vicechairman, speaking about herowninability toparticipatemorefully in the CG, said,'Ihavenoability on my own,and besides Iama woman'. Alandless womanCG member said,'Iampoor and ignorant, what will I say?Those who aremoreknowledgeable speak more[at meetings]'.
Anticipated reaction
Fear of anticipated reaction or threat of withdrawal of support from the powerfulcanbea very real barrier tocitizen participation. Because they have tol ivei n the village and have to rely on more powerfulpersons,people fear being singled out and do not want toget intoany sort of confrontation. One poor woman who does not use the clinic said 'if weall go together tocomplain [about the clinic] … we will become identified'. Amale respondent who was not aclinic user identified the role of this fear in undermining accountability:'They areall thieves, they steal the medicine,b ut wecan't complain … wehave tolivehere,don't we?'
Low self-esteem
The fact that the poor and women arenot accorded valueby the powerfuland elite reinforces low selfesteemand the belief that they arenot important. The low valueplaced on women and the poor by society impinges upon the ability tobelieveone has rights and that one can"act as acitizen". To claim one' s rights therehas tobeprior belief in one' s right tohave rights and the ability toact upon them, that is tohavebelief in one' s agency.Poor people interviewed rationalised the fact of not being informed about the CG by stating that they arenot important enough. One womancommented 'it is no use speaking with the chairmanor amember …nothing happens because they don't give us any importance'.
Invisibility
Invisibility from the public sphere restricts people' s participation space. For the vast majority of people participationis limited to the sphereof their daily productive, reproductiveand socialactivities, located within the family and extended family, the immediatecommunity of neighbours and kin,and the goshti or patron group. Invisibility is compounded by the fact that people do not havea clear notion of the interrelationship between state and citizen or about their own rights and obligations.The feeling of invisibility among the poor and women is created because they arenot called on toparticipateinany "important"public space. Poorpeople arehardly ever invited to sit on the shalish (village court)or tomediatedisputes around land.
Party politics
The politically connected and powerfuldonate the land and are selected into the CG membership, even if they lackqualities stated as necessary to participate(as in the caseofone woman selected tobeaCGmember purely on the basis that she was the wife of the politically influentialcontractor who hadbuilt the clinic). Conversely, thoseo ut of politicalfavour are unable toparticipateor are prevented from participating. For example,one CG chairman was ousted, withfalselegalcases,as soon as the politicalparty he belonged tolost the election.
7 Discussion and some concluding remarks Sofar, the effectiveness of the CGs in operating community clinics for servicedelivery to the most disadvantaged groups of the population has been limited,and their ability tofunction as a spacefor citizen participation and ameans for developing capabilities toparticipatehas been negligible. The CGs havenot been able toaddress the constraints of poverty,dependenceonpowerfulgroups, social inequality and invisibility,low self-esteem and lack of interpersonal skills and absenceofpoliticalclout, all of whichprevent citizens from engaging with stateinstitutions in decision-making processes affecting their lives.Ifanything, these structural constraints havebeen reproduced and reinforced within the CG, undermining participation within. Hence,c itizen capabilities top articipatei n governanceand accountability of stateinstitutions havenot been developed. Neither have the CGs been able tofoster a senseofcommunity since perceptions of rich-poor differences in capabilities and citizen responsibility remain very strong.
When interviewees in the case study villages wereasked what resources they believed helped in acquiring the capabilities for citizen participation, the twom ost strongly identified weref ormal schooling and mobilisation of the poor.People feel that knowledge gained formally through schooling, rather than through less visible non-formalmeans, allows one tocontribute toimproving society and influencing publica ction. Being "educated in school" is believed toimpart status (respect)and social value(especially for girls by their in-laws) and increase visibility.Education is believed to enhanceinterpersonal skills and reduceexposure toexploitation. Unity and solidarity is highly valued, especially by poor people, sinceit is believed to generate strengthand power toconfront both the lackofaccountability of stateinstitutions as well as deal with the dependenceof the poor on the patronage and support of morepowerfulgroups. Being part of agroupalso reduces the possibility of being identified or singled out and minimises individualcosts of participation. It is felt,even by the non-poor, that if poor people are united they canarticulate their demands moreforcefully.
Evidence suggests that schooling toacertain threshold level canbeanimportant resource to develop capabilities for participation and that group membership canprovide afall backagainst different kinds of class-and gender-based oppression, creating a socialand political spacefor organising collectiveaction and enhancing individualagency in taking positiveactions that improve well-being. In ruralBangladesh, the key educationalfactor is access to secondary schooling, whichfor the poor is severely constrained as a result of direct and indirect costs and the associated pressures todrop out for marriage or toenter the labour market. Access toinstitutions that promoteorganisation and mobilisation is relatively greater,and for the poor and women groupmembership appears tobe apromising resourcefor developing participation capabilities.
What this analysis has shownis that even if structuralf actors areaddressed,fundamental questions of power,hierarchy and exclusion will continue tocondition the potentialf or the emergenceofaprocess of empowerment as both driver and consequenceofcitizen participation. Investing in education and group solidarity as sources of empowerment areneither easy nor shortterm solutions.But implementing initiatives for community involvement in health suchas the CGs, without adequateattention to thesequestions, carries the riskof simply reinforcing existing power hierarchies and generating further frustrated expectations among the poor and marginalised. Mahmud(2003) .
